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"The Baha'is community, persecuted from its very inception... probably rep-
resents the clearest case of religious persecution in the world today."
-Allen K. Jones, U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1984.
"'[Tihe treatment of Baha'is is motivated by religious intolerance and a desire
to eliminate the Baha'is Faith from the land of its birth.' This comes close to
an allegation of genocide."
-International Commission of Jurists, 1982.
I. INTRODUCTION
Governments, scholars, and jurists have long criticized the inabil-
ity of the international legal community to enforce human rights stan-
dards. The Preamble to the United Nations Charter states that its
purpose is, inter alia, "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights."1 Despite the Charter's lofty ideals, widespread, egregious
human rights violations continue today. As one scholar notes, the
community of nations is "[ftaced with the problem of the de facto
inability and political unwillingness both of the United Nations and of
other regional organizations to take any significant action.., to rem-
edy even extreme situations of human rights violations .... -2
The recent persecution of Iran's Baha'i population clearly illus-
trates the inadequacy of existing mechanisms to enforce human rights
standards. Neither the accepted legal procedures nor their alterna-
tives provide satisfactory relief to persecuted minorities. Using the
Baha'is' persecution as its focus, this Note will critically evaluate these
enforcement mechanisms. It will then propose a new regime to halt or
prevent gross disregard for human rights protected under interna-
tional law.
II. IRAN'S PERSECUTION OF THE BAHA'IS
Iran's present persecution of its 300,000 Baha'is, the country's
largest religious minority group, represents an extreme example of
post-Charter human rights violations. 3 Since the overthrow of Shah
1. U.N. CHARTER preamble; see also id. art. 1, para. 3.
2. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Interven-
tion: Its Current Validity Under the UN. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 245-46
(1974).
3. See generally G. NASH, IRAN'S SECRET POGROM, THE CONSPIRACY TO WIPE-
OUT THE BAHA'IS OF IRAN, 1844-1984 (1984); Bordewich, Iran: Holy Terror on Baha'is,
THE ATLANTIC, Apr., 1987, at 26; Clifton, Death Inside Khomeini's Jails, NEWSWEEK,
June 18, 1984, at 57; Frelick, Iran's Bahai'is [sic]: Victims of Continuing Genocide, THE
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 3, 1986, at 1095 (author is Policy Analyst for U.S. Committee
for Refugees); Woodward & Huck, Iran's Holy War on Baha'is, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25,
1982, at 73.
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Reza Pahlavi in 1979 and the installation of an Islamic theocracy
under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, "198 Baha'is have been put to
death, 767 are imprisoned, some 10,000 made homeless, and over
25,000 forced to flee their country."'4 The Iranian government perse-
cutes the Baha'is on a purely religious basis, as "Mahdur al-damm or
those whose blood may be shed with impunity."'5
The Baha'is' persecutions are tantamount to systematic genocide.
In addition to summary arrest, torture, and execution,6 the Iranian
The Baha'i Faith, an independent world religion with members in more than 100,000
localities in over 340 countries and territories, originated in Persia (now Iran) in 1863.
Baha'u'llah ("Glory of God" in Arabic), a Persian nobleman, was the prophet-founder of
the Baha'i Faith. At the Muslim clergy's instigation, Baha'u'llah's forerunner, the Bab
("The Gate") and 20,000 of his followers were killed by Nasiri-Din Shah's army in 1851.
The Sultan of Turkey banished Baha'u'llah, and had him imprisoned in Akka, Palestine
(now Acre, Israel) for most of his life.
Baha'u'llah's central teachings are:
- that there is one God, the source of all religions, and that humanity must be
unified;
- that Divine Revelation is progressive, and all the great religions are of the same
origin, representing successive stages of society's spiritual development;
- that people must eradicate all forms of prejudice;
- that the sexes must be equal in all aspects of life;
- that the races are equal;
- that universal education is essential;
- that each individual must independently investigate the truth, and develop a good
character.
Baha'i law stresses daily prayer, abstention from alcohol and narcotics, and non-align-
ment with any government or political party. Baha'is obey the laws and authority of the
government under which they live, and shun all forms of subversive activity.
Because Baha'u'llah claimed to be a Prophet of God after Muhammad, Iran's fundamen-
talist clergy brands Baha'is "murtad," or heretics. Baha'is have traditionally been perse-
cuted on this basis. See generally E. BROWNE, A TRAVELLER'S NARRATVE (1893); J.
ESSLEMONT, BAHA'U'LLAH AND THE NEW ERA (1930); J. HUDDLESTON, THE EARTH is
BUT ONE CouNTRY (1976).
4. Address by President Reagan, Human Rights Day Ceremony (Dec. 10, 1985).
Among the 16 Baha'is hanged in June, 1983 were ten women and girls. One, Mona
Malmoudnizhad, was 16. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1983, at A27, col. 5. "Teheran's revolu-
tionary prosecutor, Assadollah Lajeardi declared: 'of course, even a 9 year old can be
executed if it was proved to the court that he or she is grown enough.'" Note, Justice in
Iran, 27 INT'L COMM'N JURSTS REv. 4, 5 (1981).
5. Note, Persecution of the Baha'is in Iran, 34 INT'L. COMM'N JURISTS REv. 8, 9
(1985). "[The available evidence clearly indicates that the Bala'is are being persecuted
because of their religious beliefs, and not because of their alleged past activities. The root
cause is that Baha'ism is regarded as heresy and is persecuted as such." Id. at 10; see also S.
Con. Res. 73, 96 Stat. 2670 (1981).
6. See Note, supra note 4, at 8. The Baha'is have been subject to "systematic persecu-
tion.., including summary arrests, torture, beatings, executions, murders, kidnappings,
disappearances, abductions and many other forms of harassment." Id.
The National Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States has published photocopies of
numerous Iranian government documents and judicial opinions that state unequivocally
that teaching the Baha'i Faith or belonging to Baha'i institutions are capital offenses. Note,
supra note 5, at 10; see also BAHA'I INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE BAHA'IS IN IRAN
71-86 (1981) [hereinafter BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY].
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government denies Baha'is jobs, 7 pensions," education,9 freedom to
travel abroad,10 and freedom to marry1 in violation of international
law.12 The Baha'is have no domestic legal recourse because the 1979
Iranian Constitution conspicuously fails to protect their rights.13
The Baha'is' plight underscores the failing of U.N. mechanisms
that are intended to enforce human rights standards, and the frustra-
tion of notable publicists who advocate direct, unilateral, third party
protection of persecuted individuals.14 Yet, even the advocates of
humanitarian intervention concede that a unilateral self-help doctrine
is "open to potential abuse" when third party states act for political or
military gains.15 They acknowledge that the best solution would util-
ize the collective machinery of the U.N. Charter. 16
Iran's persecution of the Baha'is is not merely another flagrant
human rights violation. Rather, the Baha'is' persecution offers a clear-
cut indictment of the U.N. mechanisms for world response to serious,
continuing human rights violations. As a result, the Baha'is' persecu-
tion should trigger a resolution for new procedures that would effec-
7. See Note, supra note 5, at 9; see also BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at
76.
8. See Note, supra note 5, at 9. "The Chief Justice of Iran, Ayatollah Moussavie
Ardebili, ordered that Baha'is who had formerly been in government service must return
all their salary, including money paid to them under the Shah's regime, failing which they
are liable to imprisonment." Id. (emphasis added).
9. See Letter from University of Medical Science to a Baha'i student (Apr., 1982)
reprinted in BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 74 (stating that the student is
being expelled because of his "belief in Baha'ism"); see also BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY,
supra note 6, at 17.
10. See Note, supra note 4, at 6. The Iranian "Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12
August 1981 ordered Iranian embassies to draw up a list of Baha'is ... living in their
jurisdiction. It also prohibited the renewal of their passports and has ordered instead the
delivery of a 'transit paper' which is valid only for a return to Iran." Id. (emphasis added).
11. See Note, supra note 5, at 10.
12. See id. For a discussion of whether binding international law has been violated, see
infra text accompanying notes 17-23.
13. "The Iranian Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians are the only recognized minorities
who ... are free to perform their own religious rites, and ... act in accordance with their
religious regulations." ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONST. art. 13, reprinted in 7 CONsTI-
TUTIONS OF THE COUNTmES OF THE WORLD (F. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986).
The President of the Revolutionary Court in Shiraz construed article 13 to make partici-
pation in Baha'i institutions and activities unconstitutional. "[I]n accordance with Article
13 of the Constitution any activities on the part of the Baha'is are against the Constitution,
.. . and according to the Constitution those who commit such crimes are considered
criminals." Khabar-i-Junub, Feb. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in BAHA'I INT'L COMMU-
NITY, MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS JULY 1982-JULY 1983, THE BAHA'IS IN IRAN 27 (1983)
[hereinafter MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS].
14. See Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IowA L. REV.
325 (1967).
15. Id. at 345-46.
16. Id. at 345 n. 116; see also Falk, The United States and the Doctrine of Noninterven-
tion in the Internal Affairs of Independent States, 5 How. L.J. 163, 172-73 (1959).
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tively enforce human rights standards without having to resort to
unilateral humanitarian intervention.
In the following sections, this Note examines the provisions of
international law that Iran violates by its persecution of the Baha'is. It
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of present enforcement methods and
proposes a resolution under which continued human rights violations
will bring swift, predictable, tangible consequences to the violator.
The Note asserts that such a concrete standard of enforcement will
serve several purposes. First, it will provide a predictable response to
flagrant human rights violations. Second, it will stop violations
through standard U.N. procedures without immediate resort to mili-
tary action. Third, it will undercut justification for humanitarian
intervention and thereby reduce the chance of such intervention
occurring.
III. IRAN'S PERSECUTION OF THE BAHA'IS VIOLATES
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHA'IS VIOLATES THE U.N.
CHARTER AND BINDING MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is
"generally regarded as a complete statement of the sources of interna-
tional law."17 In determining applicable international law, article 38
directs the court to look to: "(a) international conventions... ; (b)
international custom... ; (c) the general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations; (d)... judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists.., as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law."18
Consistent with article 38, the court determines applicable inter-
national law through its interpretation of treaties and customs. 19 As
shown below, Iran's treatment of the Baha'i minority breaches both
multilateral conventions and international custom.20 Specifically,
Iranian persecution of the Baha'is violates article 55(C) 21 and article
5622 of the U.N. Charter. It also violates three binding international
agreements: 1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights23 (ICPR); 2) the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
17. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (3d ed. 1979).
18. U.N. CHARTER app. 2, art. 38.
19. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 278 (2d ed. 1976).
20. See supra and infra text accompanying notes 17-84.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
22. Id. art. 56.
23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter
ICPR].
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ment of the Crime of Genocide 24 (Genocide Convention); and 3) the
Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation 25 (I.L.O. No. 111). Moreover, Iran's persecution of
the Baha'is violates customary international law.
1. The United Nations Charter
Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter provides: "The United Nations
shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
language, or religion."' 26 Article 56 provides: "All Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article
55."27
Although there is some debate, compelling authority indicates
that violations of article 55(c) and article 56 constitute a violation of
international law. The Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 provides
convincing authority for this conclusion. 28 In that opinion, the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) reviewed whether the U.N. General
Assembly had acted ultra vires in terminating South Africa's mandate
to administer South West Africa.29 The ICJ held that South Africa's
policy of racial discrimination violated the Charter.30 The ICJ, there-
fore, "[left] no doubt that, in its view, the Charter does impose on the
members of the United Nations legal obligations in the human rights
field."31 Similarly, in 1968, the Assembly for Human Rights adopted
the Montreal Statement, which states: "The Charter of the United
Nations, the constitutional document of the world community, creates
24. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
25. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupa-
tion, (I.L.O. No. 111) June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 32 [hereinafter I.L.O. No. 111].
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
27. Id. art. 56; see also id. arts. 1(3), 13(1), 76(e) (emphasis added).
28. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
29. Id After World War I, the League of Nations asked South Africa to administer
Namibia, a former German colony, on the League's behalf. In 1966, the U.N. terminated
the League's mandate because of South Africa's policy of forcibly separating different racial
and ethnic groups in Namibia, and its practice of excluding the indigenous population from
certain opportunities. Id para. 130.
30. Id para. 131.
31. Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 348 (1972). The ICY holding confirms that all the obliga-
tions under Article 55, including freedom of religion, constitute binding legal obligations
under Article 56.
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binding obligations for members of the United Nations with respect to
human rights.
The human rights provisions of the Charter... have the force of
positive international law."'32
Finally, the travauxpreparatoires of the Charter draftsmen reflect
an intent to bind member states to the Charter provisions. In both the
English and French versions, the drafters incorporate the language of
legal obligation. A "plain meaning" construction of the article 56 text
furnishes "at least a prima facie conclusion that [its] pledge was
intended to constitute a legal commitment on the part of the
members." 33
Critics of the argument assert that the Charter pledge is not a true
obligation. They maintain that a state's human rights policies are a
matter of domestic jurisdiction under U.N. Charter article 2(7).34
Article 2(7) states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall author-
ize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ... ,,a3 The critics con-
clude that the Charter's human rights pledges are merely aspirational
rather than binding.
In contrast, the widely acclaimed human rights publicist Hersh
Lauterpacht reads the Charter to state binding obligations. Lauter-
pacht rejects the assertion that article 2(7) reduces the Charter's
human rights obligations to a mere "euphemistic declaration. '36
According to Lauterpacht, the protection of human rights is a funda-
mental, international obligation, that falls outside of article 2(7). He
rightly concludes that "[t]his interpretation of the Charter has much
more to commend it than one which reduces it to an absurdity." 37
Richard Lillich, Chairman of the International Law Association's
Sub-committee on the International Protection of Human Rights, sup-
ports Lauterpacht's interpretation. He states that "[n]early all states
in the international community already are bound by the human rights
provisions in the U.N. Charter." 38
In summary, article 55(c) and article 56 constitute binding obliga-
tions under international law. Iran's gross mistreatment of the Baha'is
32. Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, Mar. 22-27, 1968,
reprinted in R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW AND POLICY 66, 66-67 (1979).
33. Schacter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in
American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 648 (1951).
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
35. Id. See generally H. KELSON, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 29-52 (1950).
36. Lauterpacht, The International Protection of Human Rights, 70 RECUEIL DES
COuRs 5, 24 (1947).
37. Id. at 27-28.
38. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 66.
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violates these articles and consequently violates international law. 39
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICPR)
Iran's persecution of the Baha'is violates the ICPR40 in several
significant ways. For example, according to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Iran's treatment of the Baha'is appears to violate ICPR
articles 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion),41 23 (the
right of marriage and family), 42 25 (participation in public affairs),43
and 27 (the right of a religious minority to practice and profess its
beliefs).44 Iran's persecution of the Baha'is violates articles 7 (prohib-
iting torture),45 9 (prohibiting arbitrary arrest),4 6 12 (prohibiting the
denial of passports to leave Iran),47 and 20 (prohibiting governmental
advocacy of religious hatred).48 Iran's most flagrant ICPR violation,
however, is its disregard of article 6 (the right of life),49 specifically
article 6(5) (no death penalty for persons under 18). Iran violated arti-
cle 6(5) when it hanged Mona Mahmudnizhad, a sixteen-year-old
Baha'i, on June 19, 1983.50
The ICPR binds Iran in two ways. First, the ICPR defines and
implements the obligations listed in the Charter.51 Second, it binds
Iran as a treaty signatory. The fundamental principle of the law of
treaties, pacta sunt servanda, requires all treaty signatories to honor a
treaty's stipulations. The principle states: "Every treaty is binding
upon the parties and must be performed by them in good faith .... -52
As a treaty signatory, therefore, Iran must incorporate the ICPR's
39. See generally P. JEssUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONs-AN INTRODUCTION 91
(1948) (stating that "it is already the law.., that respect for... fundamental human rights
is obligatory"); Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 62, 73 (1951) (stating that the Charter's human rights provisions impose binding
legal obligations); Scelle, [1949] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, U.N. Doc. A/CN-4/SR23/
1949.
40. ICPR, supra note 23.
41. Id. art. 18.
42. Id art. 23.
43. Id art. 25.
44. Id. art. 27; see Note, supra note 5, at 10.
45. ICPR, supra note 23, art. 7; see also Note, supra note 4, at 6.
46. ICPR, supra note 23, art. 9; see also Note, supra note 4, at 8.
47. ICPR, supra note 23, art. 12; see also Note, supra note 4, at 8.
48. ICPR, supra note 23, art. 20; see also Note, supra note 5, at 10.
49. ICPR, supra note 23, art. 6.
50. See N.Y. Times, June 22, 1983, at A27, col. 5; see also Note, supra note 4, at 5
(statement of revolutionary prosecutor indicating that execution of minors is lawful in
Iran).
51. The United Nations and Human Rights, 18 COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF PEACE 11, 33-34 (1967); see also Tuttle, Are Human Rights Really Objectiona-
ble?, 3 INT'L LAW. 385, 934 (1969).
52. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27 at 289, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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human rights provisions into its constitution and laws.53 As discussed
below, the ICPR continues to bind Iran even though the Shah signed
the ICPR before Khomeini came to power.54
Iran, however, disputes that the ICPR binds it completely. In its
response to Human Rights Committee inquiries on the status of the
Baha'is, Iran stated that "in the case of differences between the Arti-
cles of the Covenant [the ICPR] and the teachings of Islam, the tenets
of Islam [will] prevail.155 The Human Rights Committee rejected
Iran's attempt to withdraw from its obligations under international
law.5 6 Under the doctrine of pact sunt servanda, Iran's obligations
under the ICPR continue until it formally denounces them. Although
Iran disputes the binding effect of the ICPR, it has neither denounced,
derogated from, nor attached any reservations to the ICPR since the
succession of the Khomeini government.57
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention)
Iran's persecution of the Baha'is also violates the Genocide Con-
vention. Iran has signed and ratified the Genocide Convention,5 8 and
has neither denounced it nor announced any reservations.5 9 Yet,
Iran's treatment of the Baha'is closely resembles the form of genocide
described by article 2(a)-(c) of the Convention. Article 2(a)-(c) defines
genocide as the killing of the members of a group and the creation of
"conditions of life calculated to bring about [a group's] physical
destruction in whole or part."' 6 According to the State Department,
the Iranian Government continues to sponsor summary executions of
large numbers of Baha'is. 61 Iran has also banned all Baha'i religious
and institutional activities. This ban "provides the legal basis on
53. ICPR, supra note 23, art. 2, paras. 1-2; see also P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 6.33 (1983).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 74-91.
55. Note, supra note 5, at 10.
56. Id.
57. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, STA-
TUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1985, at 126-46, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/4, U.N. Sales No.
E.86.V.3 (1986) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
58. Genocide Convention, supra note 24.
59. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 57, at 93-100.
60. Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 2.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a... religious group as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part ....
Id. (emphasis added).
61. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1983, at 1262 (1984).
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which the regime can move against all Baha'is in Iran if it chooses to
do so .... 62 This concern is reinforced by the arrests of 190 Baha'is in
the four months following the proclamation. ' 63 Finally, while the
Human Rights Commission (HRC) has not formally charged Iran
with genocide, the International Commission of Jurists believes the
HRC statements come "close" to such as an allegation.64 The Com-
mission finds support in the HRC's observation that Iran apparently
desires to "eliminate the Baha'i Faith from the land of its birth. '65
4. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation (IL.O. No. 111)
Iran's continuing mistreatment of the Baha'is also violates I.L.O.
No. 111. As a state party to I.L.O. No. 111,66 Iran may not make
"[a]ny distinction, exclusion or preference . . . on the basis of...
religion.., which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of
opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation. '67 Despite
the Convention's prohibition, the Iranian government carried out a
wholesale "purge" of all the Oil Ministry's 472 employees that
belonged to "the misguided Baha'i group."' 68 The Ministry of Educa-
tion also dismissed all Baha'is, citing the fact that "the employment of
Iranians who are not followers of recognized religions.., in Govern-
ment Offices is against the law."' 69 On June 15, 1983, the International
Labor Organization (I.L.O.) informed the Iranian representative that
this practice violated I.L.O. No. 111.70
5. Customary International Law
In addition to violating portions of the U.N. Charter and various
multilateral conventions, Iran's persecution of the Baha'is also violates
customary international law. Specifically, the persecution violates the
customary international law restated in the non-treaty Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (UDHR).71 The Iranian government prac-
tices listed above violate articles 3 (right to life),72 5 (prohibiting
62. Id. at 1256.
63. Id. at 1263.
64. Note, supra note 4, at 8.
65. Id.
66. I.L.O. No. 111, supra note 25.
67. Id. art. 1, para. l(a).
68. Etela'at, Apr. 6, 1983, reprinted in MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 13, at 31.
69. Circular letter from Muhammad' All Raja'i, Guardian of the Ministry of Educa-
tion (June 30, 1980), reprinted in BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 76.
70. BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 6.
71. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
72. Id art. 3.
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torture),73 7 (right to equal protection under the laws),74 9 (freedom
from arbitrary arrest), 75 13 (freedom of travel out of Iran),76 18 (free-
dom of religion),77 22 (right to social security),78 23 (right to work), 79
and 26 (right to education).80
International opinion holds that the UDHR constitutes binding
law to the extent that it defines and implements the U.N. Charter's
human rights provisions. 81 Admittedly, only those states that recog-
nize the UDHR norms as general legal principles will make those
norms part of customary international law.8 2 However, "by juridical
consensus the rules and principles enunciated in the Declaration are
now widely recognized as forming part of the customary law and
therefore binding on all states."' 83 The UDHR thus binds Iran
whether or not Iran recognizes the UDHR as customary international
law.
B. SUCCESSION OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS FROM THE
SHAH TO KHOMEINI
The present Iranian government does not dispute that the multi-
lateral treaties signed under the Shah succeed to the present regime.
On a practical level, "Khomeini accepts the doctrine of state succes-
sion as applicable to Iran. He has paid the Shah's debts and collected
what outsiders owed the Shah's government."' 84 The agreements suc-
ceed for two reasons: 1) Iran has continued as the same integrated,
independent state before and after the 1979 revolution; and 2) the
agreements are fundamental and humanitarian in nature. Further-
more, under all theories of succession, the multilateral human rights
agreements signed under the Shah succeed to Khomeini. Three basic
theories of succession bind present day Iran to the multilateral human
rights agreements: 1) negativist succession theory; 2) universalist suc-
cession theory; and 3) modern hybrid succession theory.
73. Id. art. 5.
74. Id. art. 7. The President of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court stated on February 22,
1983, that "it is absolutely certain that in the Islamic Republic of Iran there is no place
whatsoever for Baha'is and Baha'ism." See Khabar-i-Junub, Feb. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 1,
reprinted in MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 13, at 27.
75. Universal Declaration, supra note 71, art. 9.
76. Id. art. 13.
77. Id. art. 18.
78. Id. art. 22; see also Note, supra note 5, at 9 (statement of Chief Justice).
79. Universal Declaration, supra note 71, art. 23.
80. Id. art. 26.
81. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 66.
82. Id.
83. Humphrey, Human Rights and the Peace of Nations, 31 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS
REv. 71, 72 (1983).
84. Statement of Dr. Firuz Khazemzadeh, Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Yale
University (Mar. 1986).
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1. Negativist Succession Theory
From the 19th century until very recently, negativism was the
most dominant theory of state succession. Simply defined, negativism
"regard[s] all treaties as lapsing upon the succession of states." 85
Negativism turns on the fundamental distinction between succes-
sion of states and succession of governments. A succession of states
occurs when one sovereign state substitutes itself for another through
"(a) cession, (b) annexation, (c) emancipation, (d) formation of a
union, and (e) federation."'8 6 A complete change in state identity or
personality creates a succession of states.87 By contrast, the 1979 Ira-
nian Revolution represents a succession of governments. A succession
of governments occurs "when a new leader is chosen, a party is voted
in or out of office, or a coup is successful .... ,,88 Even revolutions
that involve sweeping changes in governmental philosophy, such as
the revolutions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran, result only in succes-
sions of governments. A succession of states does not result because
the territories and people do not change.89 As one commentator
noted, "Change of government does not affect the personality of the
State, and hence a successor government is required by international
law to perform the obligations undertaken on behalf of the State by its
predecessor." 90 Thus, international obligations undertaken by the
Shah continue to bind the present Iranian regime, especially because
such "practice is tending toward a defacto succession to at least those
conventions which have a humanitarian aim." 91
The policy rationale for negativism is the third world concern
that newly independent states should not acquire the treaty obligations
of their recently deposed colonial rulers. This "clean slate" theory per-
meates the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties.92 Article 2(1)(f) of the Convention defines a newly
independent state as, "a successor state the territory of which immedi-
ately before the date of the succession was a dependent territory
85. Note, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties: The Vienna Convention of 1978,
19 VA. INT'L L.J. 885, 887 (1979); see also D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCES-
SION 130 (1956).
86. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (2d ed. 1970).
87. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 85, at 3-4.
88. Note, supra note 85, at 888.
89. Id. at 888 n.15.
90. 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 86, at 394.
91. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (1st ed. 1965).
92. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, opened for signa-
ture Aug. 23, 1978, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.80/31, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978) [herein-
after Vienna Convention]. See generally Castren, Obligations of States Arising from the
Dismemberment of Another State, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 753, 754 (1951). See also D. O'CONNELL, supra note 85.
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.... 93 Iran obviously fails to meet this criterion. Therefore, the
"clean slate" rule does not apply to Iran.94 The Convention drafters
would presume that present day Iran succeeds to the obligations of its
predecessor government.9"
2. Universalist Succession Theory
"Universalist" theory holds that all treaties automatically devolve
upon the successor government ipsejure. Under this theory, present-
day Iran automatically succeeds to the bundle of rights and duties
acquired during the Shah's regime.96 Advocates of universalism argue
that this prevents indiscriminate treaty terminations following mere
shifts in governmental control. If "international agreements are viti-
ated by every change of sovereignty... the chances of law effectively
regulating State conduct appear remote."'97 This argument is most
compelling in the context of multilateral human rights agreements; a
coup should not divest an entire population of universally recognized
human rights.
3. Modern Hybrid Succession Theory
Modem "hybrid" succession theory developed as a middle-
ground between negativism and universalism. Hybrid succession the-
ory rejects the "clean slate" theory as to multilateral legislative instru-
ments having the force and effect of customary international law.
98
Under this theory, newly independent states would only succeed to
instruments having the force of customary international law.
Like negativist and universalist theory, hybrid succession theory
would also bind Iran to the agreements. Iran could escape succession
only by formally denouncing the agreements. For example, Iran has
unilaterally terminated two articles of a Treaty of Friendship with the
Soviet Union on the basis of rebus sic stantibus,99 due to fundamental
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 92, art. 2(l)(f).
94. Id art. 16.
95. See Crawford, The Contribution of Prof D.P. O'Connell to the Discipline of Interna-
tional Law, 1980 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 21; see also Summary Records of the 1156th Meet-
ing, [1972] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 31, 32-37, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/202; A/CN.4/214/
Add.1 and 2; A/CN.4/224/Add.1; A/CN.4/249; A/CN.4/256/1972 (statements of Sir
Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur).
96. Note, supra note 85, at 886.
97. Id. at 890-91.
98. See Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law Making Treaties, 1952 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 105, 107; see also La Forest, Toward a Reformulation of the Law of State Succes-
sion, 1966 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 103.
99. The doctrine allows a release from binding treaty obligations if the petitioning
nation can demonstrate a fundamental change of circumstances that would make perform-
ance under the treaty impossible. See 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICI-
PAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-3 (1967); see also Vienna Convention, supra note
92, art. 17(2); Note, supra note 85, at 893.
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differences between the present Koran-based government and the
Shah's secular government. 1' ° This is the only treaty, however, that
the Khomeini government has formally denounced.101 Until Iran for-
mally denounces the multilateral human rights agreements, the agree-
ments continue to bind it.
IV. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING PROCEDURES
FOR ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
The weak link between international human rights standards and
state action under these standards is enforcement. This weak link pro-
vides "an argument to some that [enforcement] does not exist."102
Yet, some writers defend the effectiveness of international enforcement
methods.10 3 They point out that the methods are still new and that
states do change internal policies as a result of U.N., diplomatic, and
world public pressures.104
These enforcement procedures depend, however, on assumptions
that, when unfounded, leave no enforcement alternatives. The proce-
dures rest on two assumptions: 1) that a recognized legal "duty" or
"obligation" under international law provides protection in itself, and
2) that adverse world public opinion has an impact on a state's domes-
tic human rights policies as the "ultimate sanction of international
law."105
The second assumption mistakenly presumes that mere public
denouncement will force a state to comply with its sense of duty. In a
state like present-day Iran which ignores world opinion, procedures
that rely on a nation's sense of duty and fear of adverse opinion fail to
restrain "renegade" nations.10 6 Only adequate sanctions will force
Iran to comply with its international obligations.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes succinctly described how the law
can deter those lacking any moral reason to comply. Holmes noted:
100. Telephone interview with Mr. Amir Zamani, Advisor for Public Relations, Islamic
Republic of Iran, United Nations Mission (Apr. 15, 1987).
101. Id.
102. Shelton, International Enforcement of Human Rights: Effectiveness and Alterna-
tives, 1980 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 6, 7.
103. Id.
104. See R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 16-22, 34-35. In January, 1969,
the government of Iraq began publicly hanging Jewish citizens alleged to be Israeli spies.
The U.N. deplored the executions but took no official action. Iraq eventually relented after
press reports brought world condemnation and pressure from other Arab governments to
stop the killing. Id.
105. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFrY-SEVENTH CONFER-
ENCE, MADRID 524 (1976) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW ASsOcIATIoN.
106. Shelton, supra note 102, at 16. "We still haven't solved the problem of the
Ugandas and Cambodias, and under current procedures we may not be able to." Id.
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We fill the word ["duty"] with all the content which we draw from morals.
But what does it mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy
that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences
by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money.10 7
Transferred to an international context, an "amoral government," a
Holmesian "bad man," will not comply with moralistic urgings unless
threatened with punishment. Regrettably, present enforcement proce-
dures do not prevent recalcitrant governments from violating human
rights: the procedures simply have no teeth.
A. ACCEPTED U.N. PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCING HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS
1. Self Reporting by States
The I.L.O. Constitution and the U.N. Charter require member
states to periodically report on their compliance with the human rights
standards articulated in these documents. The I.L.O. has a Commit-
tee of Experts on the Application of Conventions that reviews member
reports and submits them to the International Labor Conference.
10 8
The U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) requires reports
from state members at three-year intervals.109 ECOSOC forwards the
reports to the Commission on Human Rights.
The obvious criticism of self-reporting is that it is self-serving.
States fearing adverse reactions from published reports may enact laws
that comply with the various standards; however, the state may still
ultimately ignore the standards. 1 0 Moreover, self-reporting will not
result in compliance with human rights standards when a nation does
not fear adverse world opinion."'
2. Interstate Protests
The ICPR and other documents permit member states to file offi-
cial complaints against other member states. States seldom fie com-
plaints, however, because they consider the process too susceptible to
political manipulation. 112
More often, a state will protest egregious human rights violations
in a formal representation, a demarche, or simply protest through pub-
lic statements to the press. These methods may produce positive
results. For example, public pressure convinced the Shah to withdraw
107. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rnv. 451, 463 (1897) (emphasis
added).
108. Shelton, supra note 102, at 8.
109. Id.
110. Note, supra note 5, at 10.
111. Id.; see also BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 1-6.
112. Shelton, supra note 102, at 11.
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his support of widespread attacks on the Baha'i community in 1955.113
In that case, public pressure was effective only because the Shah was
concerned about world public opinion.114
In contrast, recent state protests against Iran have not brought
any positive results and have often preceded violence. On July 17,
1982, seventeen governments made a joint demarche to the Iranian
government protesting its treatment of the Baha'is.115 Sixteen govern-
ments made a similar demarche on Dec. 27, 1982.116 In each instance,
Baha'is were summarily executed within days of the protests.1 7 On
May 21, 1983, President Reagan made a personal plea to Khomeini to
commute the death sentences of twenty-two Baha'is "not guilty of any
political offense or crime."' 18 On May 28, 1983, Khomeini publicly
criticized Reagan's plea of mercy for a "bunch of people who don't
even belong to any religion."' 19 Sixteen of those Baha'is, including 10
women, were hanged on June 16 and 18, 1983, and another was exe-
cuted on July 1, 1983.120
3. Petition Procedures
In June, 1967, the U.N. Human Rights Commission (HRC) and
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities (Sub-Commission) received authorization to hear com-
plaints from governments under ECOSOC Resolution 1235.121 The
HRC subsequently received authorization to hear complaints under
Resolution 1503.122 Commentators considered Resolution 1503 a
breakthrough for human rights because it allowed individuals and
non-government organizations (NGO's) to petition the Sub-Commis-
sion directly. 23 Resolution 1503 thus represents an improvement over
113. BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 38.
114. Watson, The Limited Utility of International Law in the Protection of Human
Rights, 1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 3. "Without a coercive element international
law is not well equipped to deal with the tyrant or dictator who has realized that for him
the short-term gains of ignoring the human rights of his subjects far outweigh the long-term
losses (if any) of adverse public opinion .... ." Id.
115. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 13, at 2.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id.
118. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
119. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1983, at A3, col. 2.
120. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1983, at A3, col. 2.
121. E.S.C. Res. 1235(XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 17, U.N. Doe. E/4393
(1967).
122. E.S.C. Res. 1503(XLVIII), 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. IA) at 8, U.N. Doc. E/
4832/Add. 1 (1970).
123. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 337. Secretary-General U. Thant
had previously disallowed individual petititions. Id. at 335. An "NGO" is any interested,
non-government group given consultative status at the U.N. Amnesty International, the
Red Cross, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights are well-known NGO's.
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previously adopted enforcement procedures. Its effectiveness, how-
ever, relies too much on state cooperation.
The 1503 procedure involves three steps: 1) a "Working Party"
under the Sub-Commission gathers all communications to see if there
are "reliably attested" human right violations; 2) the Working Party
shows the gathered information to the Sub-Commission, which
decides whether to pass it on to the HRC; and 3) the HRC decides
whether to investigate further, or appoint an investigating committee,
which requires the consent of the state in question. 124 The HRC keeps
confidential all communications between itself and the investigated
state. 12
5
The ultimate objective of the 1503 procedure is to elicit informa-
tion. 126 The HRC does not literally enforce human rights standards
through application of 1503. Therefore, Resolution 1503 fails to pre-
vent human rights violations for two reasons. First, fact finding,
unlike enforcement, poses no threat to a "bad" government. Second, a
1503 investigation depends on the violator's cooperation.
Investigations revealing violations may cause the HRC,
ECOSOC, General Assembly, or Secretary-General to denounce the
violator's actions. While official censure may have, for example, influ-
enced Israel to leave Lebanon, it will not affect less sensitive govern-
ments. 127 Even when the system works, the violating state may simply
ignore the Secretary-General's investigations and pleas. Critics thus
assail the 1503 procedure as time-consuming and ultimately
ineffective. 128
Ironically, the 1503 procedure fails when its success is most vital:
cases of extreme and protracted human rights violations. The result-
ing frustration with Resolution 1503 has lead to unilateral intervention
in two instances: Tanzania's invasion of Uganda, and Vietnam's inva-
sion of Kampuchea.
Amnesty International has estimated that during the eight-year
reign of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin, as many as 300,000 citizens were
124. Id. at 338.
125. Note, Commission on Human Rights, 24 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REv. 29, 34
(1980).
126. See generally Shelton, supra note 102, at 14. Shelton defines the objective of 1503
as "the study of situations which appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably
attested human rights violations and fundamental freedoms and is not for redress of indi-
vidual violations." Id. By contrast, European procedure provides for money damages to
individual victims. Id. at 13.
127. Note, The 1982 Session of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 651, 652 (1983).
128. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 359-71. One critic has commented
that "[i]t is becoming increasingly apparent ... that the 1503 procedure tends to protect
rather than restrain governments which violate human rights .... ." Note, supra note 125,
at 35.
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killed. 129 Many of the victims were tortured. 30 In 1977, Amnesty's
report to the HRC triggered 1503 scrutiny.13I The President of the
HRC stated that "decisions" were made concerning the Uganda situa-
tion at the thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions. 132
Amin's mass killings continued unabated for two more years, until
Tanzania invaded Uganda and ousted Amin in 1979.133 Although
Tanzania justified its action as self-defense, its President Nyerere
admitted Tanzania was "punishing" Amin for his cruelty, because the
community of nations had failed to do So.134 Uganda's new President
chided the U.N. for remaining silent during Amin's murderous
reign. I35
A similar situation developed in Kampuchea. Between 1975 and
1978, the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot killed one third of the
Kampuchean population, over two million people. 136 In 1978, the
HRC heard reports of the flagrant violations in Kampuchea, but
decided to postpone instituting a 1503 action. 37 Vietnam subse-
quently invaded Kampuchea in late 1979 and overthrew Pol Pot.
Vietnam justified its intervention in a manner similar to Tanzania,
using a "dual war" argument. While stressing that it had been
attacked and was retaliating in self-defense, Vietnam also claimed that
the Kampuchean people had assisted the overthrow of Pol Pot, citing
the "inhuman conditions in which the population of Kampuchea was
being kept by the regime in power."' 138
In the instant case, Iran has been under 1503 scrutiny for approx-
imately seven years. 139 During this period, the Secretary-General and
the HRC-appointed Rapporteur have repeatedly urged Iran to stop its
persecution of the Baha'is, 14° and to submit reports to the HRC.141
Iran steadfastly refuses to cooperate with the HRC.142 It continues to
129. N. RoNzrr, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION
AND INTERVENTION ON THE GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 102 (1985).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 193 n.88.
132. Id. The content of those decisions was kept confidential in keeping with the 1503
procedure.
133. Id. at 102.
134. Id. at 102-03.
135. Note, supra note 125, at 34.
136. N. RONzlTTI, supra note 129, at 98.
137. Committee on Human Rights, Report of the Thirty-Fifth Session, Feb. 12 -Mar. 16,
1979, ECOSOC Official Records, U.N. Doe E/CN. 4/1347, Supp. 6, 55-56, 135 (1979).
138. N. RONZITrI, supra note 129, at 99.
139. Note, supra note 4, at 8; BAHA'I INT'L COMMUNITY, supra note 6, at 27.
140. Note, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 32 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 33,
37-38 (1984).
141. Note, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 30 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 31, 36
(1983); Note, supra note 5, at 8.
142. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1986/41, 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 2) at
108-09, U.N. Doc. E/1986/22.
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imprison, torture, and kill Baha'is. 143 Seven years of worthless "scru-
tiny" and "urgings" demonstrate that the 1503 procedure is inade-
quate to ensure compliance with human rights standards.
It is becoming increasingly apparent to non-governmental organizations,
observers-and this view is shared by some delegates-that the 1503 procedure
tends to protect rather than restrain governments which violate human rights
.... Many NGO's are beginning to question the usefulness of submitting any
further communications to the U.N. under this procedure.
144
In light of 1503's poor track record, it seems incredible that the HRC
continues to apply it to the persecution of the Baha'is. 45
B. ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCING
HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
1. Chapter VII Procedures
If 1503 procedures fail to abate gross human rights violations,
Chapter VII contains the only alternative enforcement methods.146
Under article 41, the Security Council may direct U.N. members to
interrupt economic relations with a state if it determines that the
state's actions constitute a "threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression."' 47 If the Council concludes that such measures are inade-
quate, it may request member states to directly intervene. 48
In practice, the "threat to the peace" standard does not readily
apply to human rights violations. In cases involving apartheid or
racial discrimination, the Council has mustered the required unanim-
ity to impose economic sanctions against Rhodesia and South
Africa. 149 However, the Council has been unable to achieve the neces-
sary unanimity in cases of gross human rights violations that actually
caused a breach of the peace. For example, the Council failed to
achieve unanimity when India invaded Pakistan to protect the Bengali
population in December, 1971.150 As one commentator noted of the
Bengali case, "Except for coping with disaster relief and refugee assist-
ance, the U.N. said little and did nothing during most of 1971.'5
Relying on Chapter VII for enforcement of human rights stan-
dards leads to two problems. First, its implementation is unpredict-
able because the Council's determination of what is a "threat to" or
143. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1985, at 1240-41 (1986).
144. Note, supra note 125, at 35.
145. "Biafra, Indonesia, Sudan and Burundi are other recent examples of the ineffective-
ness of international organizations." Fonteyne, supra note 2, at 237.
146. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39, 41, 42, 48, 51.
147. Id. arts. 39, 41.
148. Id. art. 42.
149. See generally R. LILLicH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 390-448.
150. d at 485-542.
151. Id. at 487.
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"breach of" the peace is completely arbitrary. 152 Second, Security
Council action under Chapter VII requires unanimity, in practice a
nearly impossible prerequisite. 153
The Security Council has yet to invoke Chapter VII sanctions
against Iran for its persecution of the Baha'is. Chapter VII economic
sanctions would be particularly effective because of Iran's struggling
economy. The Security Council's failure to invoke Chapter VII is
probably due to the Baha'is' passivity in the face of persecution. The
Baha'i Faith stresses loyalty to the existing government and exhorts its
adherents to follow domestic law. The Security Council cannot initi-
ate Chapter VII proceedings unless the Baha'is react violently to their
persecution, thereby triggering the Chapter's "threat to or breach of
peace" language. Are the Baha'is less deserving of Chapter VII pro-
tection because they remain quiescent in the face of severe persecu-
tion? If so, the "threat to the peace" standard only protects oppressed
minorities who tend to be violent. Such a paradoxical result is
unsatisfactory.
The Baha'is' passivity precludes the possibility of Chapter VII
intervention. Moreover, as discussed above, self-reporting, interstate
petitions, and 1503 procedures likewise fail to protect the Baha'is.
The Baha'i case is therefore a perfect analytical paradigm to fashion a
new enforcement procedure. It is, on the one hand, typical of egre-
gious domestic violations by governments unresponsive to 1503 proce-
dures. It is atypical, however, in that the victimized group is a model
of passivity and cooperation. Justice requires a new human rights
152. A comparison between the Southern Africa and Bangladesh cases illustrates the
arbitrariness of the Council's "threat to" or "breach of" peace determinations. The Rho-
desia case appeared to be a victory for human rights advocates because it suggested that
gross violations may be construed to constitute threats to the peace automatically, because
"practices of indignity and strife which begin as internal in physical manifestation in a
single community quickly and easily spread to other communities and become international
.... " R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, supra note 32, at 407. The Bangladesh case, however,
once again called into question the ability of the U.N. to respond to human rights viola-
tions. Although actual regional military action and bloodshed were present, the Security
Council failed to label the situation a threat to the peace or an act of aggression. A liberal
reading of article 39 might allow the U.N. to take stronger action if it can resolve that gross
violations do automatically constitute threats to the peace because of the essential interde-
pendence of nations. See McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The
Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INt'L L. 1 (1968); Note, U.N. Sub-commis-
sion on Discrimination and Minorities, 31 INT'L COMM'N Juiusrs REV. 37 (1983).
153. For example, Security Council resolutions to impose sanctions on South Africa for
its apartheid policies received triple vetoes, from France, the United States, and the United
Kingdom, in 1975 and again in 1976. The three states finally reversed their vetoes in 1977
after the murder of black activist Steven Biko. 30 U.N. SCOR Supp. at 47, U.N. Doe. S1
11713 (1975); 31 U.N. SCOR Supp. -, U.N. Doc. S/12211 (1976); R. LILLICH & F. NEW-
MAN, supra note 32, at 420. The Security Council achieved unanimity only in the 1950
Korean crisis, after the Soviet delegate boycotted. Up until that time, the General Assem-
bly had to usurp the responsibility under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. See Comment,
The "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of the United Nations, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1951).
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enforcement procedure that would protect non-violent, persecuted
minorities, like the Baha'is, whose oppression falls outside Chapter
VII.
2. Humanitarian Intervention
The futility of enforcement attempts, as well as the futility of find-
ing a satisfactory legal basis for human rights, has led one commenta-
tor to conclude that "the main effect of the universal human rights
movement will be a seriously diminished credibility for international
law. This will be no less a loss, because it is the product of impeccable
intentions."15 4 Such cynicism rings true considering the trend toward
justifying unilateral armed intervention by a state or states on the
grounds of humanitarianism.
Humanitarian intervention is the obvious alternative, besides
Chapter VII, to traditional U.N. enforcement mechanisms. Humani-
tarian intervention, however, has no historic basis and is "radically
contrary to article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter." 15 5 Article
2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations."15 6 Article 2(4) arguably prohibits
nations from exercising force to stop human rights abuses in other
nations.
Professor Lillich advocates the use of forcible humanitarian inter-
vention and its subsequent validation under five criteria: 1) the imme-
diacy of the human rights violation; 2) the extent or degree of the
violation; 3) whether intervention was invited; 4) the degree of coer-
cive measures employed; and 5) the relative disinterestedness of the
intervening state.1 57
Lillich offers a compelling but unsatisfactory solution. First, ex
post facto review fails to provide security to the community of nations.
Allowing states to use force and after-the-fact rationalizations would
disrupt the delicate balance of international relations based on sover-
eignty. Second, Lillich's solution fails to account for article 2(4)'s
express ban on force. The solution merely ignores the ban in its advo-
cacy for intervention. Commentators express the justifiable fear that
legalizing humanitarian intervention through a restrictive reading of
article 2(4) will lead to expansionism under the aegis of human
154. Watson, supra note 114, at 6.
155. N. RONzrrTT, supra note 129, at 108.
156. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
157. Lillich, supra note 14, at 344-51.
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rights. 158 Finally, legalizing humanitarian intervention may also
"erode the psychological constraints of the use of force for other
purposes.... 159
Despite the dangers of abuse, commentators conclude that
humanitarian intervention should be allowed on a limited scale
because no viable alternatives exist. The advocates of intervention
must admit that, in the case of the Baha'is, humanitarian intervention
is impossible. Iran's strategic importance severely restricts the likeli-
hood of any kind of humanitarian intervention. The intervening
nation would not be able to convince a disbelieving world that it
invaded for purely apolitical, humanitarian reasons.' 60
V. A PROPOSAL FOR AN EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE TO
ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
The Baha'is' plight encompasses all the recurrent problems of
human rights enforcement procedures that rely on adverse public
opinion. Seven years of world protests and 1503 procedures have not
stopped the violence.161 The Baha'is' persecution falls outside Chapter
VII protection because their passivity prevents threats to or breaches
of the peace. Moreover, non-Iranian Baha'is will never threaten to
intervene. Because the Baha'is are innocent, 162 their case presents a
compelling opportunity to finally resolve the internal conflict between
the humanitarian pledges and the proscribed use of force in the Char-
ter.163 Iran's gross mistreatment of the Baha'is should force revision
of existing enforcement procedures. Otherwise, groups like the
Baha'is, arguably deserving heightened protection, "fall between the
cracks" of present enforcement methods.
Despite a poor track record, the U.N. is capable of enforcing
human rights standards with efficiency and predictability. As one
commentator stated, "No organization other than the U.N. is in a bet-
158. Fonteyne, supra note 2, at 248.
159. Farer, Humanitarian Intervention _ The View from Charlottesville, in HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 149-52 (R. Lillich ed. 1973). A com-
plete analysis of whether or not humanitarian intervention has a basis in customary
international law, and whether it is legal under the Charter is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a discussion of humanitarian intervention, see supra text accompanying notes
154-59. This Note assumes that legalized unilateral humanitarian intervention is too
unpredictable and offers too much opportunity for abuse to be legal.
160. See Lillich, supra note 14, at 350-51.
161. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 142.
162. See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, at A9, col. 1.
163. Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 159, at 171. "The preamble and
critical first Article of the Charter, framed in the awful shadow of the atrocities of war, left
no doubt as to the intimate nexus that the framers perceived to link international peace and
security and the most fundamental human rights of all individuals." Id.
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ter position to detect breaches or evaluate facts in light of the existing
legal rules, to observe and inquire, to take diplomatic, political or mili-
tary action." 164
The General Assembly or the Security Council should create by
resolution the following declaration and procedure: 165
I. Resolved, that all unilateral or multiparty intervention upon the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state is a breach of
international law and will be considered as an act of aggression for
purposes of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
II. When the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities determines that a report on a state
reveals "a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested human
rights violations," 166 and passes the report on to the Human Rights
Commission (HRC), it sets in motion a statute of limitations, which
begins to run as soon as the State in question is informed that it is
under 1503 scrutiny.
III. For two years following date of notice, the HRC shall make all
standard inquiries and recommendations under the 1503 procedure to
bring about noticeable improvements. If the HRC sees no tangible
improvement in the state's human rights record (i.e. change in sub-
stantive law or abatement of persecution) within those two years, it
may make a "recalcitrant government" recommendation to the Gen-
eral Assembly (GA).
IV. When two years from the date of notice lapse, the recalcitrant
government recommendation to the GA becomes automatic, unless
expressly waived by the HRC and substantial evidence of improve-
ment exists.
V. The recalcitrant government recommendation remains until
rebutted. The recalcitrant government has 90 days to show tangible
proof of improvement in its domestic human rights situation. If it
does so, the HRC continues to monitor the state.
VI. After 90 days, if the recalcitrant government fails to show proof
of improvement, the GA shall pass economic sanctions against the
recalcitrant government that will be mandatory for all U.N. members.
164. De Schutter, Humanitarian Intervention: A United Nations Task, 3 CAL. W. INT'L
L.L 21, 36 (1972).
165. A resolution of this type is within the powers of either the General Assembly or the
Security Council, under articles 10 and 25 of the Charter, respectively. See Schwelb, supra
note 31, at 337. Scholars have debated the idea of incorporating humanitarian intervention
into U.N. procedure by General Assembly resolution. According to Prof. Lillich, such a
project would take ten years or more to get up through the various committees and onto
the floor of the General Assembly. Advocates of reform could expect the same schedule for
the present proposal. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 105, at 475-
540; see also Comment, supra note 153, at 129.
166. Shelton, supra note 102, at 14.
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The GA can remove such sanctions upon tangible proof of
improvement.
VII. If there is no improvement for one year after the imposition of
economic sanctions, the GA shall exercise military force to compel the
recalcitrant government to protect its citizens' human rights. The
force shall be multinational and politically disinterested.167 The GA
shall withdraw the force upon satisfactory improvement of the govern-
ment's human rights record, or satisfactory changes in domestic law.
The recalcitrant government procedure offers four distinct advan-
tages over traditional humanitarian intervention. First, it is com-
pletely predictable: it incorporates a time frame and unequivocal
notice. Second, it is apolitical. Third, it resolves more satisfactorily
the conflict between article 2(4)'s ban on military force and the need to
exercise force to stop extreme human rights violations. The procedure
allows the recalcitrant government ample opportunity to preserve its
protection under article 2(4). The government has exactly three years
and ninety days after 1503 notice to improve its domestic human
rights practices. If it fails to do so, the recalcitrant government waives
its article 2(4) protection by demonstrating its disregard of the Char-
ter's human rights purposes. Under this proposal, the U.N. will toler-
ate a state breaching the preamble while benefitting from article 2(4)
for exactly three years and 90 days. Finally, the procedure eliminates
the need for unilateral armed self-help by states for humanitarian rea-
sons. Such action is expressly outlawed.
It is unlikely that the General Assembly will resort to the propo-
sal's military force provisions. Rather, it will use the entire procedure
to obtain leverage during 1503 exchanges. Recall that Uganda was
under 1503 scrutiny for eight years, Iran for seven years, with no
marked improvements. 16 The proposed procedure gives oppressive
governments ample time to improve their human rights record. Yet
its provisions do not allow oppressed groups to suffer indefinitely.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed procedure is merely a framework for reform of the
existing inadequate enforcement mechanisms. Specific details and pol-
icy factors may be added. Its main virtue is that it does not allow
oppressive governments, such as Iran, to violate fundamental human
rights law by simply ignoring world opinion. Even a "recalcitrant
government," such as Iran, will follow the lofty ideals of the
167. De Schutter, supra note 164, at 35.
168. Note, supra note 125, at 34; Note, supra note 4, at 8.
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U.N. Charter when its violations produce inevitable and harsh
consequences.
Paul D. Allen

